The 302nd
ENGINEERS
by,
Gilbert H. Crawford
Thomas H. Ellett
John J. Hyland
Chapter 8
To The Argonne Forest

WHILE the 77th Division was engaged
in the Vesle Sector, other Allied forces were likewise
advancing on other fronts. From the North Sea to Rheims,
limited offensives had been launched with gratifying
success. The entire salient extending from Soissons
through Chateau-Thierry to Rheims had been blotted out,
largely by the aid of American troops; the British had
attacked in force on 8th of August; and the French were
"nibbling" at the western end of the Chemin des
Dames.
On 12th of September, the American First Army, for the
first time operating as an independent unit, began an
attack on the St. Mihiel salient, east of Verdun. This
salient which had been held by the Germans since 1914,
was strongly defended. As a matter of fact, the enemy had
planned in the Summer of 1918 to use it as a base for
another attack on Verdun if their July 15th attack on
Rheims proved successful. Notwithstanding the strength of
the position, however, the salient was wiped out after
two days fighting by the American forces; many prisoners
were taken and much valuable material was captured. The
77th Division did not participate in this battle, because
still engaged north of the Vesle.
This brilliant first offensive by the
Americans had been planned for some time by the General
Staff, but was executed under peculiar difficulties. As
late as 2nd of September, Marshal Foch had gone to
Chaumont (American General Headquarters), and had placed
before General Pershing the plans for the general attack,
which was to begin 26th of September and was to extend
from the North Sea to the Meuse River. He requested
General Pershing to cancel the arrangements for the St.
Mihiel battle. Preparations were so far advanced,
however, that it was finally agreed that a change of plan
would not be advisable. Marshal Foch, therefore,
permitted the attack to be made according to schedule,
with the understanding that the objectives would be
limited. This accounts for the non-exploitation of the
initial St. Mihiel success.
In accordance with these secret orders (2nd of
September), the American Commander-in-Chief had to make
plans for the battle set for 26th of September-which
proved to be the great final battle of the war-before
knowing the outcome of the St. Mihiel offensive which was
set for 12th of September. Under the circumstances, it
was difficult to predetermine the number of troops which
would be available for the later battle. Contrary to
expectation, the St. Mihiel engagement was consummated
with comparative ease, and with relatively few
casualties, so that practically all the American
divisions that participated in the 12th of September
battle were also available for the 26th of September.
When preparing for the great battle of the 26th of
September, General Pershing summoned practically all the
American divisions then in France, except the 27th and
the 30th, which were in Flanders with the British. It was
for this reason that the 77th Division was transferred
directly from the Vesle to the Argonne Forest, without
any rest after its strenuous activity from 10th of August
to 13th of September on the Vesle front.

On the evening of the 15th of
September the Regiment marched from the vicinity of
Mareuiel-en-Dole, south through the Forest de Nesle,
Nesle, Coulonges to the woods near Villers-Agron-Aiguizy.
In these peaceful woods, far to the rear of the fighting
lines, the Regiment rested until the evening of the 17th
of September. Then, crowded into French motor trucks, the
men were transported, during the cold, rainy night of
17th-18th of September through Epernay, and
Chalons-sur-Marne to Verrieres, a few kilometers south of
historic St. Menehould. Verrieres was reached during the
day of the 18th of September. This quiet little village
of wooden shacks was located on the western edge of the
Foret d'Argonne many miles south of the battle line. The
Regiment still labored under the delusion that there was
to be a rest, so orders were sent forth for a general
"clean-up" and drill, the latter consisting of
practice reconnaissance in the woods.
The Forest of the Argonne, where so much of the history
of the American Army in France was enacted, is a narrow
forest running from Grand Pre on the north, about fifty
kilometers, nearly due south to Villers-en-Argonne. The
front line for four years had roughly bisected this
forest, running nearly due east and west, just south of
Varennes and Binarville. Where it was held by the
Germans, the forest was nowhere more than four or five
miles wide. The Aire River bounded the forest on the
east, and the Aisne on the west. Hills ran the length of
the forest between these two rivers, a main ridge running
through the center from north to south, with numerous
ravines on either side emptying into the river valleys.
From 1914 to 1918, both French and Germans had strongly
fortified the naturally difficult terrain. Mine warfare
had flourished in this region as late as 1916, but in
September, 1918, the area was considered
"quiet", and troops were sent there for their
"rest" periods.
In the plans for the great battle
about to begin, the American Army had been assigned to
the front from the Meuse River, west to and including the
Argonne Forest-a front of about twenty miles. The forest
itself was to be attacked by the 77th Division and the
left brigade of the 28th Division (Pennsylvania National
Guard). Thus it came about that the 77th Division was to
form the left flank of the entire American Army. To the
west came the French divisions.
In order completely to surprise the enemy, great care was
taken to conceal the arrival of the Americans behind the
lines which were then held by the French. Movements were
made at night only, even when taking place far to the
rear. The 302nd Engineers marched into the front line
sector on the night of the 20th of September, and during
the following day relieved the French engineer troops.
This relief consisted in taking over the various mines
which the French had long before prepared against the
possibility of a retirement. In several places the main
north and south road from Les Islettes had been heavily
mined by the French. Engineer details were placed in
charge of each of these works with instructions to fire
the mines in case of retirement, which fortunately never
took place. On the contrary, the Boche engineers, during
the ensuing six weeks, had to fire innumerable road mines
to impede the Allied advance.
When the Regiment assumed its new duties, all seemed at
peace in the beautiful forest. The weather was still
good; scarcely a shot was heard. The war seemed far away.
From the 20th to the 26th of September, little or no work
was done by day. Even important reconnaissances were not
made for fear that the Germans might discover that the
Americans had arrived in force, and would then suspect
that an attack was to be made. In order to insure the
deception of the enemy, a thin fringe of French infantry
outposts were left to repulse enemy raids.
During the night, however, all was activity for the
engineers. Parties of officers scouted the front lines
to become familiar with the ground. Stores and tools were
carried forward, mostly by hand.
One very important mission that was accomplished by the
Regiment prior to the big attack was the cutting of the
wire in front of the Allied trenches. Picked details from
the different companies worked during two nights cutting
these lanes, so that the infantry would not be impeded at
the beginning of the advance. This was hazardous work,
but because -of the general quietness of the sector, it
was successfully completed without casualties.

The following report of Major
Per-Lee, dated 24th of September, describes vividly the
front and the engineer activities just before the
beginning of the battle of 26th of September:
Headquarters, 302nd Engineers,
American AEF, Sept. 24, 1918.
From: The Commanding Officer, 1st 13n. 302nd Engrs.
To: The Commanding Officer, 302nd Engineers.
Subject: Reconnaissance of the RAVINE des COURTE CHAUSSE.
1. In company with Captains Howry, Harder and Lieutenant
Macqueron and thirty-two men from the 1st Bn. we explored
this ravine from a point not quite up to PIERRE CROISEE
at co-ordinates 00.7-268.98.
2. The ROUTE MARCHAND is of no use excepting for men on
foot or very light vehicles and then only up as far as
99.4-268.7; the lower end of ROUTE MARCHAND is nothing
but a pair of tracks deep in the mud dwindling to a goat
trail at the eastern or upper end of the ravine.
3. Acting under your instructions we laid out eight wire
cutting parties of four men each under the direction of
two sergeants-now acting lieutenants. Captain Howry took
the left half of the 153rd Brigade Sector with
wire-cutting parties numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4, the centres
of which are approximately at the following points: 1:
297.4-268.8; 2; 297.7-268.85; 3; 297.95-268.85; 4;
298.4-268.8. These paths cut through the French wire
range in general from MARCHAND ROAD up to and in some
cases beyond line of the French outpost pickets or
extreme outpost line.
4. Captain Harder took the right of the 153rd Brigade
Sector with wire-cutting details 5, 6, 7, and 8, located
as follows: 5; 298.8-268.8; 6; 299.5-268.75; 7;
299.75-268.8; 8; 300.15-268.9.
5. With the exception of 5, these cuttings were made
directly up over the hill through the French wire at the
points described to ap-proximately the extreme outpost or
picket line.
6. No. 5 runs from RAVINE SEC to the crest of the hill
between PPs 34 and 35.
7. While we made these cuttings as ordered it was
apparent that very large numbers of troops could be taken
up to the extreme out post lines and the numerous spur
trenches with which they are surrounded, and that the
wire-cutting could be taken up from the outpost lines
across No Man's Land, to the German trenches without
hindering the bringing up of men.
8. The RAVINE COURTE CHAUSSE and the RAVINE SEC, which is
the small ravine running northwest from MARCHAND TUNNEL,
lend themselves very favorably to the bringing in and
dispersing of troops throughout the 153rd Brigade Sector
with practically little or no possible observation from
the Germans.
9. In my opinion, if French guides were assigned to the
various, units concerned, platoons, companies, and
regiments could, with little difficulty, be dispersed on
the French outpost lines even on a very dark night and if
there was a little moon, very easily.
10. The thirty-two men of the 1st Bn. Engineers now
assigned to the wire-cutting details could, in a manner,
help, as guides, but as their
experience in the place has been of a few hours duration,
too much should not be asked of them. There are several
routes of bringing troops across and into the RAVINE DES
COURTE CHAUSSE, the best one seems to be the boyau
COLONIAU which runs from the RAVINE GOURAUD-south
entrance at point 299.95-267.9-, its northern terminal
point is on the crest of the hill at the outpost lines.
It crosses the ROUTE MARCHAND at 299.02-268.6. It is a
very deep, fine, trench almost completely duckboarded
throughout, and troops can file through it very rapidly,
as a path leads from this trench on the bottom of the
RAVINE VOURTE CHAUSSE which leads almost directly to the
MARCHAND TUNNEL 400' west. The MARCHAND TUNNEL is very
close to the centre of the Brigade Sector, from this
point; well protected and concealed; troops can be
dispersed either east or west or north.
11. There are two other boyaus: BLAINVILLE and MARCHAND,
but I am not familiar with them. Also troops can be
brought into the RAVINE DES COURTE CHAUSSE from the la
CHALADE and FOUR
de PARIS ROAD. However, this road is enfiladed from the
German positions and after the ROUTE MARCHAND branches
off from it, it is as above described, very muddy and in
very poor condition. I visited three extreme outpost
positions: 34, 35, 36, which are almost directly north of
the MARCHAND TUNNEL. I found the routes up to the
positions all entrenched in good condition, splendidly
concealed by high grass on both banks. However, the
positions themselves do not give a very extensive
view-perhaps fifty yards and in some cases Possibly one
hundred can be seen in advance of these positions. I was
told that PP 34 was in sight from the German positions so
I climbed over the top and walked a few feet forward
where I was blocked by a chaos of trench, chevaux de
frise, and the most amazing barricades of wire that I
ever have seen.
12. The trenches seem to lead entirely across the crest
of the hill and where the French could not make further
use of them they blocked them with heavy wooden doors and
filled the trenches forward with chevaux de frise and
loose barb wire.
13. None of our men were fired upon nor as far as we
could determine was our presence known to the enemy. I am
supported in my opinion that the place to start the wire
cutting is from the extreme outpost line, by the
concurring opinions of Captains Harder an(I Howry, and
Lieutenant Macqueron of the French Army.
H. B. PER-LEE,
Major, Engineers U. S. A. Comdg. 1st. Bn.
As' the time drew near for the attack, the Regiment received its orders, which were briefly:
1. To have platoons with the advancing infantry, and 2.
To build roads across No Man's Land.
The details of these orders are shown in the following
"Annex No. 1, Field Order No. 43". From a
casual reading of this order it is obvious that the
equipment which each man was required to carry was
exceptionally heavy. Indeed, it is doubtful if troops
advancing into battle were ever before in the world's
history, handicapped with such a burden. Had it not been
for their light-heartedness they could never have
staggered forward at all. As matter of fact, before the
advance actually began, the men managed to rid themselves
of much of this material.
ANNEX -NO. I
To Accompany Field Order No. 43
INSTRUCTIONS FOR DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS AND ATTACHED
PIONEER TROOPS.
1. MISSION--(,t) To provide routes of advance for the
Infantry and Artillery. (b) To furnish Engineer material
for all troops at the most advanced points and at the
earliest possible moment after H hour. (c) To de gas and
rid of traps all eaves and dugouts. (d) To destroy or
nullify and mark all enemy mines.
2. (a) The 1st Battalion, 302nd
Engineers, plus 1 battalion, 53rd Pioneers (less 1 1/2
companies) under command Major Per-Lee. 302nd Engineers,
will advance in the zone of the right brigade and will be
responsible for Engineer operations in this zone.
(b) The 2nd Battalion 302nd Engineers and 1 1/2 companies
53rd Pioneer Infantry under command of Capt. F. S.
Greene, 302nd Engineers, will advance in the zone of the
left brigade and will be responsible for engineer
operations in this zone. Three Platoons will be assigned
to accompany each front line battalion under the order of
the battalion commander. It will lie the duty of these
platoons to open up four (4) routes over the trenches and
wire of our own defenses and those of the enemy, for each
of the 4 Infantry regiments, file remainder of the
Engineers, assisted by the Pioneer Infantry, will provide
two (2) routes for the Artillery in each brigade zone,
working in close liaison with Artillery regimental
commanders.
:
3. ADVANCE DUMPS, ETC.-Advance dumps
will be established ;It la CHALADE (7.8-6.7) for the East
Zone, and at 5.3-8.9 for the West Zone. The Regimental
Supply Officer will procure the necessary materials,
which will be moved to these localities by the Regimental
Transport Officer, using Engineer Train and Regimental
Transport. battalion commanders will keep Infantry and
Artillery commanders informed of the tools and materials
in these dumps available for use.
4. EQUIPMENT TO BE CARRIED-Each
enlisted man will carry rifle and bayonet and 50 rounds
of ammunition, or pistol and ammunition; canteen filled
with water, tea, or coffee, three days' rations. Each
squad of the advance element will carry:
(This bridge will be taken up on will be carried by the
platoon.)
Three motor trucks on each of the four artillery roads
will be taken forward as close in rear of the advance
Infantry as possible and along with our rear elements.
These trucks will be taken as far forward as possible
without blocking the Artillery at point where limbers and
guns can be taken over but trucks cannot. They will there
be moved clear of the road, thus forming a more advanced
mobile dump of Engineer materials.
6. Motor trucks will. be loaded as
follows:
TRUCK B:
10 Long charges 15-ft. length, 1 Hand pile-driver, 3-man
25 Round pine poles (4 to 6 in.) 50 Shovels
20 Pieces 3-in. lumber 25 Picks
100 Ft. of I in. rope 10 Axes
I Small coil smooth wire 50 Wire cutters
30 Small lashings 10 Pliers
10 Heavy hammers I Keg nails
10 Light hammers 1 Keg spikes
6 Mauls
TRUCK C:
25 Round pine poles 20 Pieces 3-in. timber
2 Wheel-barrows 1 Barrel chloride of lime
1000 Sandbags
7. Limber tool wagons will be taken
as far forward before H hour as possible, on each
Artillery road, and will be moved clear of the road. One
limber tool wagon will follow on each road immediately
after the trucks. Remaining limber tool wagons will
follow immediately after the Artillery across No Man's
Land.
The Regimental G. S. limber wagons, loaded with men's
packs, rations, forage, and cooking utensils, will follow
tool wagons.
Remainder of Regimental Transport and horse-drawn section
of Engineer Train will await orders at billets, ready to
move.
8. Battalion Commanders will make arrangements to mark
all drinking water points and all water points for
watering horses on the advance. A supply of signs will be
furnished Battalion Commanders for this purpose by this
office.
9. The Headquarters Company will move
the lighting plant forward with each advance of the
Division P. C., which will be kept lighted at all times.
10. The Lieutenant- Colonel, Captain
Topographer, Regimental Adjutant, Sergeant-Major, two
stenographers, and liaison group, will accompany the
Regimental Commander to each succeeding P. C. The
reproduction and drafting sections and the remainder of
the Headquarters Company, under command of the Regimental
Supply officers will continue in its present location
until further orders.
11. The Camouflage Officer will
proceed forward with the Regimental Commander and will
have his P. C. with Regimental Headquarters. He will
maintain liaison with Artillery units and will arrange to
have ample camouflage materials in the advanced
Divisional Engineer dumps, available for use.
12. LIAISON-Advance elements will
report to Battalion Commanders once each hour, conditions
and location, reciting any special features. Battalion
Commanders will similarly report to the Regimental
Commander each two hours, forwarding reports of advance
elements. Regimental Headquarters at H hour and until
further orders will be at the Division P. C.

It was known that the space between
the lines was literally covered with jungles of barbed
wire. Entire reliance was not placed on the cutting of
this wire prior to the " jump off". Explosive
charges, called "pipe torpedoes", were,
therefore, prepared. To Co. "A" was assigned
the task of making these torpedoes, under the supervision
of Captain Howry and Master Engineer Fitzgerald. The
torpedoes consisted of two-inch pipe filled with TNT.
When one of these was exploded in a belt of wire, the
wire absolutely vanished and with it, the pickets and
everything else that was near at hand, leaving a wide
path through the tangle. The great difficulty was to
transport these dainty weapons in safety and to explode
them where needed.
In addition to the torpedoes, the men of the Headquarters
Company prepared some nets made of chicken-wire, which
were designed to be thrown across the barbed wire belts,
over which it was then possible to scramble without great
difficulty. Again the main problem was to transport these
bulky nets to the sections where they were most needed.
History does not record that either the torpedoes or the
nets were used to any great extent.
Behind the lines all was strenuous activity and hurried
preparation. The concentration of artillery had never
been equalled. No sooner was the Divisional Artillery in
position, then up came the Corps and Army Artillery, with
some attached French battalions. No pity was to be shown
to "Jerry"-he had a right to dread what was in
store for him!
To the wise, the word was passed around that this was to
be the heaviest assault ever undertaken by the Allied
forces. At last the date, and then the time, of the
"H" hour was announced. Over the top at 5:30 A.
M., 26th of September! Hours before that time, the French
Artillery to the left began to boom thunderously. Then
the American guns took up the bombardment. There was
scarcely any return fire from the enemy. A very heavy fog
covered the ground. Although, on the whole, this was a
great advantage to the attackers, it increased the
difficulty of orientation in the forest, and was a source
of great annoyance to the men.
Except for the inevitable difficulties of advancing
through the tangled mass of wire, the labyrinth of
trenches, and other natural obstacles, there was little
opposition to the attack. Everywhere the enemy trenches
were deserted. The American Infantry never made an attack
against less enemy resistance. If the Germans had stood
their ground in the strong fortifications of the forest,
the advance through the Argonne would have cost the 77th
Division a much greater loss of life than it actually
sustained. As matter of fact, the Boches hastily fled at
each point of attack, and it was not until reserves were
brought up that a stand was finally made. By that time,
the fortified trenches had been captured, and the
advantage of position had been lost. Before the end of
the first day's battle, the enemy retained only the
natural advantage of being on the defensive.
Thus it was, that by early afternoon of the 26th, the
Divisional objective was reached; the enemy had been
routed out of his carefully prepared fortifications into
the open woods. The first step of clearing the forest had
been accomplished with few casualties.
The Engineers w e r e also active during these momentous
hours. Co.'s "A", "C", "E",
and "F" advanced with the attacking infantry,
explored dugouts, in marked trails, and in general made
themselves useful whenever there was engineering work to
be done during the advance.
The road work to be done had been assigned to Co.
"B" and Co. "D". It was planned to
have two artillery routes in each brigade sector. In the
eastern sector, the map showed a secondary road leading
from the demolished village of Le Four de Paris
diagonally across the forest to Varennes, which was
behind the German lines. This road was to be repaired by
Co. "B". In the sector allotted to Co.
"D" was the Vienne le Chateau-Binarville Road.
These two roads were the only available routes in front
of the whole Division, and the latter road at its
northern end was outside of the divisional boundaries.
Because of the rugged nature of the ground, it was not
possible to construct new roads in time to be of use. The
map also showed an unimproved earth road in the eastern
sector called the Haute Chevauchee, which wound its way
northward along the heights of the forest. The task of
making this road passable was also assigned to Co.
"B".
To open up these three artillery roads across No Man's
Land was no mean task for two companies of engineers.
Luckily, at the last minute before the attack, three
companies of the 53rd Pioneers were attached to the
Regiment to assist in this work.
Aided by several hundred negro troops of the317th
Engineer Regiment, who also arrived at this critical time
as if by magic, the road-building operations of Co.
"B" proceeded much more rapidly than had been
anticipated. The Four de Paris Road was opened for
traffic by 7:00 P. M., 26th of September, long before it
could be used. On this road alone, where it passed
through No Man's Land, were the following obstructions:
Fifteen distinct wire entanglements, 7 deep trenches, 4
barricades, 1 mine crater 125 feet in diameter and 30
feet deep; 1 other large crater, and many shell holes and
small unexploded road traps, as well as 1 concrete
"pill box".
The work on the Four de Paris Road was accomplished by
the 1st and 4th Platoons of Co. "B", under the
supervision of Lieutenant Weston and Sergeant 1st Class
Jorgensen, aided by three platoons of the 53rd Pioneers
and several companies of the 317 (colored) Engineers. One
of the latter companies was commanded by Lieut. T. G.
Townsend, ex-Co. "A". This road was of vital
importance during the Battle of the Argonne, as it was
the only stone road leading into the forest from the
southern end. Traffic from several divisions continually
used it.
During the heavy bombardment extending over four years,
the Haute Chevauchee Road had been literally blasted from
the face of the earth. It was not even possible to trace
this road, so complete had been its destruction. A new
road had to be traced connecting the north and south
ends. With the material then available it was possible
only to make a soft road by filling in the old trenches
and shell holes with earth. By noon of 27th of September
this road was ready for light animal-drawn traffic. It
was never in condition to be used for heavier traffic.
Had it been possible to plank this road, it would have
served as an excellent one -way route for the traffic of
two divisions-the 77th and the 28th
The work on the Haute Chevauche Road was done by the 2nd
and 3rd Platoons of Co. "B", under command of
Lieutenant Romeo, assisted by three platoons of the 53rd
Pioneers. Troops from the 28th Division, and a number of
colored corps troops also worked on this road.
In the meantime, Co. "D",
under command of Captain Simmons, were engaged on the
very difficult and dangerous mission of repairing the
Vienne le Chftteau-Binarville Road. During the afternoon
the 26th of September, a reconnaissance was made by Major
Giesting and Captain Simmons. From the old French line
across No Man's Land, the road-bed had been practically
wiped out by shell fire and trenches. During the
reconnaissance it was observed, however, that the road
continued back of the German lines, and was there in good
condition. Actual work began on this road on the 27th of
September. The usual obstacles were encountered:
quantities of wire entanglements shell holes, trenches,
mud, etc.
On the 28th this road had been repaired up to the German
support trenches, where a narrow-gauge railroad had been
operated by the enemy. At this point, under the direct
supervision of Lieut. J. F. Brown, a 30-foot bridge was
built. The erection of this bridge was carried on under
machine gun and artillery fire. Throughout all these
operations the men were almost constantly under direct
enemy observation, especially the carrying parties who
packed the heavy bridge timbers on their shoulders down
the road in full view of the Boches, for about a
kilometer. This bridge was completed on the 29th, and the
next day was strengthened so as to carry heavy traffic.
As the advance progressed, Co. "D" continued
work on this road, and on 1st of October erected a bridge
over a tank trap south of Binarville. The French, as well
as the American divisions used this road.
The great final battle of the War had commenced.
Everywhere, from the North Sea to the Meuse, the Allies
were attacking. The American Army was the right flank of
the Allied forces. Much depended upon its strength and
success, for its task was to smash the "hinge"
of the German defense. Its ultimate object was to break
the four-track railway running from Mezieres to Sedan.
This railway was about forty miles north of the
"jump off" on the 26th of September. It was a
most important route for supplies as it connected the
German armies in the east with those in Flanders. If this
line were broken, the enemy would be compelled to retire
from Northern France and part of Belgium.
Everyone realized that this was no easy task, and no one
anticipated, on that foggy morning of late September that
it would be accomplished so quickly. It may be
interesting to recall here that in the advances that were
to take place, the 77th Division gained more ground than
any other American division. Every foot of the territory
from le Four de Paris to the Meuse at Remilly was
conquered by the 77th Division. It therefore seems
probable that the302nd Engineers accomplished more in the
way of road- repair, bridge-building (both foot and
artillery), construction and repair of light railways,
and encountered more road demolitions than any other
American regiment. How ever that may prove to be, the
fact remains that the Regiment was constantly at the
front, often with detachments in advance of the Infantry,
and always at its work of IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS-the
primary function of pioneer engineer troops